Introduction
Different contemporary feminist theoretical approaches, particularly the care 1 Prof. University of Florence, Italy. mail: brunella.casalini@unifi.it. ethics of Kittay (1998) and Tronto (1993; , studies on precarity (Butler, 2006; , the "social flesh" approach of Carol Bacchi and Chris Beasley (2002; 2012) , the philosophy of the law of Martha Fineman (2008) , the ecofeminism of authors like Val Plumwood (2002) and Stacy Alaimo (2009) , have focused their attention on the subject of vulnerability. This thought moves on two separate yet closely interrelated fronts (see, in particular, Gilson, 2013) . On the one hand, we have the unveiling of forms of vulnerabilisation, of "precarity" (Butler, 2009 ), or of "pathogenic vulnerability" (Mackenzie, 2014) , socially induced to maintain the current hierarchies of power that exist among the various social groups, focusing attention on the methods used to produce them and also on the way in which they have changed over recent decades due to globalisation and the advent of neoliberal politics. In this direction, especially through criticism of modern rationalism and liberal ontology, they help us understand the reasons why what Martha Fineman calls the "myth of autonomy" (Fineman, 2004) is so hard to die, so resistant On the other hand, these reflections move on the front of the elaboration of a different way of thinking politics which starts from our needs, from the body, from its dependence on the natural and social environment, from the tangible conditions that make social reproduction possible. The underlying idea, from this point of view, is that only by recognising our shared ontological vulnerability and acknowledging the way in which the removal processes that have allowed it to be ignored have worked, putting the same forms of social reproduction at risk, can we also succeed in eliminating those forms of inequality that now justify the inferiorisation and social disadvantage of certain groups, those groups that social sciences define as "vulnerable" groups (see Ferrarese: in this issue). It is my contention that it is from the relationship outlined between these two possible kinds of vulnerability that the essential contribution of the feminist theory on this matter stems, a contribution which is not limited to the critical and deconstructive level. This political conception of the individual and of human nature corresponds, at an epistemological level, to a vision of the subjects as independent as they are isolated, as autonomous as they are self-sufficient, the rationality of whom is considered as a capacity to detach themselves not only from links and from tangible situations in which people find themselves, but also from their temporally finite and materially conditioned bodily reality. As written by Plumwood (2002: p. 42) , modern rationalism has conceived every form of link as a possible source of error. The known object is extraneous to the knowing subject. The latter is able to change and act on the known object, but not vice versa: the subject remains closed off from the known object, a timeless, detached mind, separate and sovereign compared to nature, immune from every form of affection and change through contact and relations with the outside world. The illusion on which the sovereign subject is erected is at the basis of a distorted perception of the human condition which leads to an overestimation of personal security, to an underestimation of his dependency and interconnection with others and with the environment, and to a failure to recognise his vulnerable personal condition.
Rational and monological subjects have therefore been able to imagine themselves free and independent, and to remove their intrinsic vulnerability, projecting that vulnerability onto something else outside of and below human, and consequently excluded from the sphere of their privileges. The autonomy of rational subjects is, from this point of view, the result of a privilege that enables the offloading of damages, consequences and burdens deriving from the course of action that they alone are able to decide to undertake, onto others. Joan Tronto talks about "privileged irresponsibility" (Tronto, 1990 (Tronto, , 1998 ; but see also: G i l s o n , 2 0 1 1 ; Zembylasa, Bozalekb and Sheferc, 2014), while Eve Kosofky Sedgwick (1990) had used the expression "epistemological privilege of ignorance", two concepts which appear closely connected because it is from ignorance, from not knowing or, better, from being able to allow oneself the luxury of not knowing certain aspects of life and the human condition, that a failure to undertake responsibility derives.
As sustained by the contemporary epistemology of ignorance (cf. Tuana, 2004; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007; Gilson, 2011; , Logue, 2013 Code, 2014) of "a substantive epistemic practice" in itself (Alcoff, 2006: 40) . Like knowledge, ignorance is a social construction and even "actively sought after, consciously produced, strategically deployed, ferociously consumed, and carefully maintained" (Logue, 2013: 53) .
The main instrument used by modern thought to erect that boundary between human and non human which has been essential in order to maintain the privilege of being able to ignore corporeity, meaning what makes us vulnerable and exposed to others at all times, has been the use of dualism, in the various forms in which it can be presented: nature/culture, body/mind, 2 The imperative of the deconstruction of dualism and of its impoverished interpretation of reality is at the centre today, in particular, of the so-called "New Materialist Feminism". In this recent philosophical perspective, this second wave of feminism has erroneously given in to the subject/object, reason/sentiment, male/female, able/disable, socio-cultural forces/materiality Therefore, dualism produces inequality, dominion and de-responsibility on the moral front, in relation to that which and those who have been inferiorised. The inferiorised other is also vulnerabilised, via exclusion from the distribution of the advantages of social cooperation and the weight of burdens which temptation of dualism, in the moment that it wanted the women to be moved "from the category of nature to the kingdom of culture" (Alaimo, 2008 , 239, cit. in Wingrove, 2015 . On the meaning of the recovery of materiality and biology of the new materialist feminism, see also Casalini (2015) .
Periódico do Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre Gênero e Direito
Centro de The request for recognition of the "non-natural" nature of care activities, so that they could be listed as falling rightfully within the "work" sphere, was one of the main claims of materialist feminism (cf. Delphy, 2009) and of Marxist feminism (cf. Federici, 2012) sphere of subsistence (without an exchange value) and has, at the same time, justified its low remuneration, considered as a mere supplement to the salary of the man of the house, the only person really capable of supporting the family, as well as the temporary, part-time and unqualified nature of most of the activities that fall within the care sector. Precariousness is that form of vulnerability universally shared by all human beings, and also characterising non-human animals, which has to do with our bodily, fleshy nature, which makes us needy of food and a roof over our heads, and makes us vulnerable to violence, to injury. By virtue of the body, which, according to Butler (2014: 58) , is "synonymous with 'mortality', 'vulnerability' and 'action'", The link that precariousness, our dependency and interdependency determine is not voluntary and consensual, does not passaccording to Butler -from the mediation of a moment of will and deliberation: "it precedes the contract, and is often effaced by those forms of social contract that depend on an ontology of volitional individuals" (Butler, 2009: xxvi) . To a certain extent, because our ontology is a social ontology, and our being is always exposed to others, to social regulations and to the political and social structures historically given, we can never know precariousness if not in the forms of precarity. Vulnerability is, therefore, universal in the form of precariousness and, at the same time, particular in the form of precarity. As individuals, we are diversely positioned in relation to the experience of vulnerability, "it cannot be properly thought of outside a differentiated field of power and, specifically, the differential operation of norms of recognition" (Butler, 2006: 44) . The epistemology of ignorance, which acknowledges no responsibility towards what is outside its cognitive interests, is replaced by the reference to an unavoidable "epistemic responsibility" (Code, 1987) which has to make us critically assess the circumstances in which knowledge (including that of a scientific nature which we usually consider neutral) is produced and cultivate a form of "epistemic vulnerability" (Gilson, 2011; example, posed hundreds of people on a melting iceberg to protest global warming the term used to articulate people and place on the Greenpeace website's account of this event was 'vulnerability': "Without clothes, the human body is vulnerable, exposed, its life or death at the whim of the elements. Global warming is stripping away our glaciers and leaving our entire planet held cartels saying "We are humans!" to protest against their "bare life" (Agamben, 1998) conditions in the camp. In all these cases, the activist's body, and the spectacle of his vulnerability, is used a "fleshy" weapon or tool that activates affective forces and so can be 
